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1.  Introduction 
A recent hypothesis in the literature is that economic performance will be furthered by the 
absence of economic and ethnic divisions (see e.g. Easterly and Levine, 1997 and Alesina et 
al., 1999).  Knack and Keefer (1997), for example, note that for countries like Norway, 
Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Canada, a high degree of homogeneity both in terms of 
income and ethnicity goes along with a high degree of economic performance.1 The 
explanation behind this linkage is that people with a greater set of similar characteristics are 
more likely to form partnerships and start to cooperate.2   
In this paper, we examine the effect of economic and ethnic division in the case of the South 
African society. This society is extreme in its heterogeneity, with segmentation along both 
racial and income divides. In particular, before the break down of apartheid in 1994, the black 
population3 received less than 50% of the national income, but this share had risen to 75% in 
19954 (Stewart 2000). However, at the same time intra-racial income inequality had increased. 
Amongst black households the Gini index increased from 0.49 in 1970 to 0.59 in 2000, while 
among the whites it moved from 0.43 to 0.49 (Whiteford and van Seventer 2000).  
Widening income gaps within ethnic groups can imply low intra-group trust levels, next to the 
low trust between groups. To study both aspects of the trust problem, we conducted trust 
game experiments in South Africa, in which the subjects were given information about their 
opponents’ race and income characteristics. The trust game, originally developed by Berg, 
Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), is a two-player game in which the first player, the sender, 
sends part of his initial endowment to the second player, the receiver. The experimenter 
triples the sent amount, and the receiver can then decide which part of his total endowment 
(the tripled transferred amount plus the initial endowment) to return to the sender. The game 
is called a trust game as the amount the sender transfers to the receiver gives an indication of 
the sender’s trust in the willingness of the receiver to reciprocate. The trust game has emerged 
                                                           
1
 Incidentally, based on the World Social Survey measurement, these five countries also have the highest level of 
trust. The close correlation between trust, social homogeneity and economic performance can also be derived 
from the experimental results by Glaeser et al. (2000) who find that when individuals are closer socially, trust 
and trustworthiness tend to be higher. 
2
 However, as shown by Collier (2001), democracy may considerably soften the detrimental effects of ethnic 
diversity on economic growth. 
3
 According to the 1996 census 77% of the 40,583,573 people in the country were black and 11% were white, 
while Indians (3%) and colored (9%) people made up smaller percentages. 
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as one of the leading experimental instrument for the measurement of the level of 
cooperativeness in societies (see Glaeser et al. 2000; Camerer 2003) 
We employ the trust game to assess the degree to which racial and income disparity may be 
degrading trust and, thus, hampering economic development in South Africa. More 
specifically, the questions that we raise include: Is the level of trust and cooperative attitude in 
the South African society generally (disregarding specific race and income disparities) 
different from what has been reported in the literature on other societies? In what ways does 
information on the race and the income characteristics of a trading partner determine the level 
of trust and reciprocity in the multiply segmented South African society? The answers to 
these questions are obviously vital to economic and social development, because trust and 
cooperation across racial and income boundaries will be necessary in order to reduce 
transaction costs and, thus, to enhance economic exchange and efficiency.  
While several experimental studies have examined the effect of ethnicity on trust and 
trustworthiness, no study so far has attempted to disentangle the ethnicity effects from the 
income inequality effects. Gneezy and Fershtman (2001) studied Israeli partnerships in which 
the individuals were informed on their partner’s last name. Since last names in Israel are 
generally indicative of the pre-immigration ethnicity, the names may be used to discriminate 
between partners from different ethnical origins. In fact the study shows a systematic mistrust 
of “eastern” males resulting in a lower efficiency of the partnerships they were involved in. 
On first sight, this outcome seems to imply a clear case for ethnic discrimination. But, a closer 
look at the income distribution across the ethnic divide reveals that there may have been an 
effect of income inequality that confounded the results. Since individuals of “eastern” origin 
are much more likely to be in the lower income groups (see Gneezy and Fershtman 2001) and 
since the actual income level of the subjects was not controlled for, it remains unclear, 
whether the discrimination (i.e. the distrust) was towards the “eastern” males or towards 
“poor” males.  
In a study with US subjects, Eckel and Wilson (2003) find that allowing individuals to 
observe their partner’s picture increases trust and trustworthiness. However, they also find 
that the pictures can lead to ethnic discrimination, because minority groups (in particular 
African-Americans) are less likely to be trusted than the majority groups (Caucasian). Again, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
4South Africa had a Gini Index of 0.58 in 1997, which made it the country with the highest inequality after 
Brazil with a Gini index of 0.63 (World Bank, 1997). 
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there is no control for the income distribution effects, which happen to point in the same 
direction as in the Gneezy and Fershtman study: The ethnic group that is mistrusted happens 
to be the ethnic group with the lower average income.  
In a study with South African subjects, Burns (2003) conducted dictator and trust games with 
high school students in the greater Cape Town area.5 To check the effect of race on the 
propensity to trust, subjects were shown pictures of their partners. In the dictator games, 
blacks are favoured by non-whites, but not by whites, who show no bias towards any race. In 
trust games, however, black students are trusted less by all groups, including their own group. 
Once again, this seems to be clear evidence for the prevalence of racial discrimination, but 
there is no control for possible confounding effects of income inequality. As in the other two 
studies, the group that is being mistrusted most also represents the poorest ethnic group, 
leaving the question open, whether racial or income discrimination has been detected here.  
Our experimental design allows us to disentangle the two main division lines that exist in 
heterogeneous societies (i.e. the racial or ethnic and the income divides) by giving subjects 
information both on the income level and the race of their partner. Surprisingly, we find 
neither a purely racial nor a purely income-based discrimination effect. Instead, we discover a 
strong and significant intra-racial envy effect that – to our knowledge – has not been reported 
by any study so far. We find that the low income individuals of both races invest little in 
partnerships with a high income partner from the other race. This effect can be considered a 
robust discrimination effect, because behaviour in the baseline treatment without information, 
which we conducted with a randomised sub-sample of our subjects, neither exhibits 
significant differences within the subject pool, nor significant differences when compared to 
the behaviour observed in earlier experiments without information.   
We proceed in the following fashion. Section 2 describes the experimental protocol. Section 3 
contains the results on the effects of information. In particular it discusses whether 
discrimination, if it exists, is based on income or on race. Section 4 figures out the correlates 
                                                           
5Experimental studies on trust in (South) Africa using experiments are rare. Barr (2003) conducted experiments 
in Zimbabwe in order to detect which factors contribute to the feeling of shared social identities within 
communities. Carter and Casteillo (2003) examine the level of trust for South African communities in the 
province of KwaZulu-Natal, investigating the difference between rural or urban communities in the degree of 
intra-racial trust. In a closely connected study, Haddad and Maluccio (2003) conduct household-level research in 
KwaZulu-Natal. Their results suggest that both local trust (in neighbours and extended family) and income level 
are important for financial group participation, which is shown to be correlated with economic prosperity.  
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of survey questions with experimental decisions and thereby analyzes the impact of social 
distance on the propensity to trust. The last section concludes. 
2. Experimental Procedures 
The subjects played the one-shot trust game. We applied the strategy method, where each 
subject decided how much to transfer both in the role of sender and the role of receiver.6  
Subjects knew at the start of the experiment that they had to play both roles. The role that 
determined the actual payoff was drawn randomly. Both sender and receiver were endowed 
with 20 Rand. (At the time of the experiment the exchange rate was ¼    5DQG $V
senders, subjects were asked to decide how much of their endowment they would like to 
transfer to a receiver. To decrease decision complexity and paperwork, the sender transfer was 
restricted to being zero or any even integer smaller or equal to 20. As receivers, subjects were 
asked to decide how much they would like to transfer back for each of the 11 possible 
amounts (0, 2, …, 20) that they may have received from a sender. Additionally, each subject 
was asked to report both the amount expected as a return on the own transfer as a sender and 
the amount expected as an investment as a receiver.7  
Our treatment variable is the information that subjects received on the characteristics of their 
counterparts. Upon recruitment, subjects were asked to report their race8 and to compare their 
family income to average family income in South Africa. Based upon this self-assessment 
information, we categorized our subjects according to their race (B = black; W = white) and 
their income level (L = low income, i.e. below average; H = high income, i.e. above average). 
In the “information” treatment, the information both on the race and the income level of the 
counterpart was given to each subject before any decision was made. In the “no information” 
treatment, no such information was given to subjects. The experimental conditions, including 
the number of observations for all the distinguished subject types and treatments, are 
summarized in Table 1.  
                                                           
6
 We applied the strategy method, as we had to recruit a large part of our subjects on the spot and did not know 
in advance whether a counterpart for each recruited subject could be found. 
7
 The instructions to the subjects are contained in the appendix. 
8
 In South Africa students are normally asked to indicate their race upon registering for a university or a school. 
Hence, asking for this information does not have to generate suspicion with the subjects regarding the 
experimenters’ intentions. No single subject objected to providing the information on the race.  
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A total of 172 subjects participated in the experiment, 94 black and 78 white. 112 considered 
their family income to be below average and 60 above.9 Obviously, the population 
distribution at the universities is not equivalent to the distribution of race and income in the 
general population of South Africa. But, note that this does not disturb the internal validity of 
our experimental investigation, because the socio-economic matching that we used in each 
partnership was pre-defined and known to the subjects. Hence, the population distribution 
played absolutely no role in the decision-making and the evaluation of the results. 
 
Table 1.
 Experimental conditions and number of observations in South Africa trust game. 
  Information* 
  
No information* 
BL BH WL WH 
Total 
BL 15 15 15 15 20 80 
BH 1 6 1 0 6 14 
WL 4 4 7 7 10 32 
Subjects’ characteristics 
WH 8 9 8 10 11 46 
 Total 28 34 30 32 47 172 
*) In the “information” treatment, subjects were given both race and income level information on their 
counterpart before the transfer decisions were made.  No such information was given at any time in the “no 
information” treatment. 
 
The experimental sessions were conducted in October 2003, at the Potchefstroom University10 
(predominantly white) and at the Mafeking University (predominantly black). We conducted 
the experiment using pen and paper. A post-experimental questionnaire, containing some 
general questions and some standardized items on equity preferences, was solicited from each 
subject after the experiment (see Appendix XX). After all sessions were completed, each 
subject’s decision form was linked to that of another subject, respecting the pre-determined 
matching that was recorded on the subject’s decision form.11 Next, the role of the subject in 
                                                           
9
 We used an open advertisement recruiting procedure at the two universities visited. Even though the student 
population can be considered as biased towards the high income groups, the frequency of high income blacks in 
the population is so low, that we were not able to recruit as many BH subjects as we had initially planned.  
10
 Conducting the experiments was made possible by the hospitality of the Economics Department of 
Potchefstroom University; especially professor Wim Naudé’s support was indispensable.   
11
 Note that the strategy method guarantees that each decision form can be considered an independent 
observation, because no interaction has taken place, when subjects make their decisions. Furthermore the 
strategy method guarantees that we can match unbalanced groups without letting any subject play more than 
once and without deceiving subjects. 
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the partnership was determined randomly and with equal probabilities. Finally, the subject’s 
payoff was calculated using the linked decision forms and the subjects were paid in cash.  
3. Results  
3.1 Outcomes without race and income information 
In the original trust game of Berg et al. (1995) subjects were not provided with any socio-
economic information on their counterparts. Nevertheless, it is clear that the subjects had 
some general notion of the cultural environment, in which their partnerships were. All 
subjects in that study were university students in the USA. Our subject pool is similar, 
because all our subjects are university students in South Africa. Clearly, a basic assessment of 
the general level of trust and trustworthiness exhibited by our subjects is necessary to ensure 
comparability of our results concerning the main treatment effects (i.e. the effect of socio-
economic information on behaviour). Hence, we conducted the “no information” treatment, 
which provides us with such a general benchmark, because it elicits behaviour with the same 
amount of socio-economic information as was given in the original study. In other words, by 
comparing the results of our “no information” treatment to the results of Berg et al. (1995), 
we can examine in which way trust and trustworthiness in South African student communities 
differs from the US students behaviour, when behaviour in both cases is elicited in absence of 
socio-economic discrimination effects.  
Table 2 presents summary statistics on the original study by Berg et al. (1995) and our two 
treatments. The table displays the number of independent observations, the initial endowment 
size, the observed proportion of senders transferring zero, the average investment ratio (i.e. 
the ration of the sent amount to the endowment), and the average return ratio (i.e. the ratio of 
the amount returned to the initial endowment plus received transfer). It is striking how close 
the values of the three observational variables are, when we compare our “no information” 
data to the original data. In fact, statistical tests confirm that there is no difference between the 
behaviour of US and South African subjects in the trust game.12  
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 We use the Mann-Whitney U-test to check for location differences between the Berg et al. (1995) data and our 
“no information” data. We neither find significant differences (not even on a 20%, one-tailed level) in the 
portion of senders sending zero, nor in the investment ratio, nor in the return ratio. 
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Table 2.  Comparison of Behaviour of Subjects in Berg et al. (1995) and South Africa 
South Africa1) 
 
Berg et al. 
(1995) No Information With Information 
Independent Observations 32 28 144 
Initial endowment Size 10.00 US $ 20.00 ZAF $ 20.00 ZAF $ 
Proportion of first players who sent zero 0.06 0.04 0.09 
Investment ratio (ratio of investment to endowment) 0.52 0.55 0.45 
Return ratio (ratio of return to amount available) 0.28 0.28 0.29 
1) In Berg et al. (1995), second players make responses only when senders invest more than zero while in South 
African experiment subjects continue to play as we used the strategy method. 
 
Interestingly, this result also goes through, if we compare the behaviour of the subjects in 
each of the socio-economic groups of the “no information” treatment separately. Table 3 
reports the investment ratio (both actual and anticipated) as well as the return ratio (both 
actual and anticipated) for the sub-samples in the “no information” treatment.13 Trusting and 
reciprocating behaviour in none of the sub-sample groups of the “no information” treatment is 
statistically different from the behaviour of the Berg et al. (1995) subjects. Furthermore, none 
of the across sub-sample comparisons (e.g. BL vs. WL, BL vs. WH etc.) reveals a significant 
difference in behaviour. Thus, despite the fact that the South African society is rather 
heterogeneous, it seems that the general level of trust and trustworthiness (as measured by the 
trust game) is similar to the level found in more homogenous societies (Camerer 2003) when 
discrimination based on the race or income information is not possible. 
 
Table 3.
  Average percentages of available amounts in the “no information” treatment. 
Socio-economic group BL WL WH 
Investment ratio 0.56 0.60 0.56 
Anticipated investment ratio 0.62 0.70 0.61 
Return ratio 0.30 0.26 0.30 
Anticipated return ratio 0.31 0.33 0.33 
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 The BH sub-sample is left out of this analysis, due to the very small number of observations we have. 
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3.2. Aggregate outcomes with race and income information   
The last column of Table 2 displays the average aggregate outcomes in the “information” 
treatment, in which subjects were given socio-economic information on their counterparts. 
Despite the fact that there are a few more investors sending 0 and that the average aggregate 
investment is slightly lower in the “information” than in the “no information” treatment, we 
do neither observe strong and significant differences when comparing our treatments to one 
another, nor when comparing them to the results of Berg et al. (1995). Even a closer look at 
the relationship between the invested amount and the return ratio, does not reveal any 
behavioural differences on the aggregate level. As displayed by Figure 1, the way the average 
return ratio increases with the investment level seems to be very similar both with and without 
socio-economic information.  
 
 
 
No Information With Information 
Figure 1. Aggregate return ratio at different investment levels. 
3.3. Group specific investment decisions with race and income information   
While the effect of race and income information seems rather small in the aggregate, we can 
use our detailed data to analyse whether differences exist between the socio-economic 
groups.14 Figure 2 shows the average investment ratio exhibited by the subjects in each of the 
four socio-economic sub-samples (BL, BH, WL, and WH) of the “information” treatment 
when facing a receiver from their own or from each of the other groups. To facilitate the 
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 Even more detailed information on the average investment and the return ratios, as well as the anticipations 
thereof, is presented for all groups and treatments in Appendix A. 
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comparisons, the average investment ratios are shown as deviations from the average 
investment ratio in the “no information” treatment (i.e. 0.55). We use the behaviour in the “no 
information” treatment as a benchmark, because it cannot be biased by any deliberate 
discrimination that specifically targets the socio-economic group of the counterpart. 
Furthermore, since we have established that the behaviour in our “no information” treatment 
is indistinguishable from the trust game behaviour observed in completely different cultural 
settings, the “no information” benchmark seems to exhibit a certain degree of universality.   
 
Figure 2. Average investment ratio 
Note: The bars represent the average investment ratio in each socio-economic group (sub-title on top) in 
partnerships with subjects of each socio-economic group (indicated on the X-axis). (a) Significantly lower 
investment ratio in partnerships with WH receivers than in the no information benchmark. (b) Significantly 
lower investment ratio in partnerships with BL than with WH. (c) Significantly lower investment ratio in 
partnerships with BH than with any other socio-economic group (WH, WL and BL).  
 
The left most section of Figure 2 displays the average investment ratios chosen by BL-
subjects in each of their four possible partnerships. Although all four averages lie below the 
benchmark of the “no information” treatment, only investment ratios in partnerships with 
WH-subject are on average significantly below the benchmark.15 The third section of Figure 2 
shows that WL-subjects also tend to invest less when they have socio-economic information 
on their counterpart than when they do not. Exactly as in the case of the BL-subject, a cross-
racial relationship specifies the only partnership, in which the WL-subjects’ investments are 
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 We compare the group’s decisions with the overall averages (benchmark case). It would not change our 
results, if comparison were made with group averages. Moreover, we do not find any statistically significant 
differences in the behaviour of the BL subjects when comparing locations, i.e. Potchefstroom to Mafikeng. 
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significantly lower than in the “no information” benchmark. The average investment ratio of 
the WL-subjects in informed partnerships with BH-subjects is just above 17%, which is not 
only dramatically and significantly less than the average 60% investment ratio of WL-subjects 
in the “no information” treatment, but also significantly less than any of their average 
investment ratio in partnerships with any of the other three groups (47.5%, 55.7%, and 52% 
for BL, WL, and WH, respectively).  
The second and fourth sections of Figure 2 show that while WH-subjects on average do not 
differentiate their investments by socio-economic categories (i.e. there are no significant 
effects of the socio-economic information on investment behaviour), the BH-subjects do. The 
average investment of BH-subjects in partnerships with BL-subjects is significantly lower 
than their average investment in partnerships with WH- subjects. The average investment 
ratio of BH in BL-partnerships (25%) is also substantially below the BH average investment 
ratio in the “no information” benchmark (55%). The lack of statistical significance in this 
comparison is most probably due to the relatively small number of observations with BH-
subjects. 
The fact that subjects differentiate their investments according to the socio-economic 
characteristics of their counterpart can be based either on a preference for discrimination or on 
distrust. Distrust towards a certain other group may not be justified, i.e. that group may 
actually be trustworthy on average, but thought to be the contrary, perhaps due to wide-spread 
prejudices in the investor group. In this case, we do not observe a personal preference for 
discrimination, but a societal tendency. Finally, if the distrust is actually justified, because the 
average return by partners from the specific socio-economic group is below the return by 
others, then the low investment may be solely driven by economic incentives and completely 
free of a preference for discrimination. 
Figure 3 shows that subjects in two of three cases, in which we observe extremely low 
investment ratios, BL in partnerships with WH and BH with BL, are mainly driven by a 
preference for discrimination. In both of these cases, the expected average return ratio of the 
group discriminated against is not lower than that of any other group. Hence, since subjects 
on average expect a similar return to their investment, there is no economic reason to invest 
significantly less in one project than in the other. In contrast, the extremely low investment 
case that we observed, WL in partnerships with BH, actually seems to be based on economic 
motives, since the WL-subjects on average expect significantly lower return ratios in 
partnerships with black counterparts than with white counterparts. While it seems clear that 
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the WL-subjects keep investments to BL and BH-subjects low, because they distrust them, it 
is not obvious, whether this distrust is actually justified or whether it is a form of “second 
order” discrimination, because it is based on prejudices and false beliefs concerning the 
economic behaviour of a specific socio-economic group. As the analysis of the actual return 
behaviour in the next sub-section shows, the latter is the case, i.e. the low expectations that 
the WL-subjects have concerning the return behaviour of BL and BH-subjects turn out to be 
wrong. This obviously leaves the question open, why the WL-subjects have such a grossly 
wrong opinion on the behaviour of the BL and BH-subjects.  
  
Figure 3. Average anticipated return ratio  
Note: The bars represent the average return ratio expected in each socio-economic group (sub-title on top)  in 
partnerships with subjects of each socio-economic group (indicated on the X-axis). (a) Significantly lower return 
ratio expected in partnerships with BL than with WH. (b) Significantly lower return ratio expected in 
partnerships with BH than with WH. (c) Significantly lower return ratio expected in partnerships with BL than 
with BH. 
 
3.4. Group specific return decisions with race and income information   
Figure 4 indicates the average return ratio chosen by the subjects of each socio-economic 
group in their partnerships with subjects of different socio-economic groups. None of the 
average return ratios is significantly different from the average return ratio observed in the 
“no information” treatment. Furthermore, there is only a single case in which the subjects of 
one group significantly differentiate their return responses on the basis of the socio-economic 
characteristics. BL subjects exhibit lower return ratios in partnerships with WH subjects than 
with WL subjects. This seems to correspond to the cross-racial envy effect that we also 
Inves ting s ubjects
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
BL BH W L W H BL W H BL BH W L  W H BL BH W L  W H
Returning Subjects
A
n
tic
ip
at
ed
 
re
tu
rn
 
ra
tio
 
Black  
High(BH)
W hit e Low (W L)Black  Low (BL) W hite High  (W H)
a b
c
 12
observe concerning the investment ratio of the BL subjects. It seems that WH subjects are 
generally treated somewhat worse by the BL subjects. Note first, that this behaviour must be 
driven by some non-monetary motivation, because the BL subjects invest less in partnerships 
with WH subjects even though they do not expect lower returns. Note also, that the adverse 
treatment of WH subjects by BL subjects cannot be a purely racial differentiation effect, since 
we observe a (insignificantly) higher average return ratio of the BL subjects in partnerships 
with WL subjects than in any partnership with black subjects.  
 
Figure 4. Average return ratio 
Note: The bars represent the average return ratio in each socio-economic group (sub-title on top) in partnerships 
with subjects of each socio-economic group (indicated on the X-axis). (a) Significantly lower return ratio in 
partnerships with WH than with WL. 
 
Figure 5 displays the average investment ratios that were expected in each type of partnership 
by the receiving subjects in each of the socio-economic groups. As in the previous figures, the 
average investment ratio expected in the “no information” treatment is used as a benchmark. 
In general, the expressed expectations are not significantly distinguishable from the 
benchmark. Nevertheless, two interesting observation can be made. First, in many cases 
where an above benchmark investment ratio was expected, the actual investment ratio was 
below zero and vice versa. In other words, the expectations are not always well aligned with 
the actual behaviour. Second, the only significant effects observed relate to the expectations 
of white subjects concerning the investment ratios of BH and WL subjects. All white subjects 
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expect too low investment ratios by BH subjects and too high investment ratios by the WL 
subjects, when compared to the actual investment behaviour. 
 
Figure 5. Average anticipated investment ratio.  
Note: The bars represent the average investment ratio expected in each socio-economic group (sub-title on top) 
in partnerships with subjects of each socio-economic group (indicated on the X-axis). (a) Significantly lower 
investment ratio expected in partnerships with BH than with WL. (b) Significantly lower investment ratio 
expected in partnerships with WH than with WL. (c) Significantly lower investment ratio expected in 
partnerships with BH than with WL. 
 
3.5 Payoff consequences 
In the analysis so far, we focused on detecting differential behaviour and expectations. When 
subjects’ choices were in conflict with their expectations of monetary income, we could 
localize a preference for differential treatment for which a payoff disadvantage was taken into 
account. In this section we pursue the question how the observed behaviour translates into 
payoffs for the different subject types. Since we have elicited strategies from our subjects, we 
can create a more complete picture of the distribution of payoffs by calculating the average 
payoff each subject would have had, if we had matched him/her to every possible counterpart 
from the corresponding socio-economic group. The top two panels in Figure 5 show the 
averages of these population payoffs for the investors and the receivers, correspondingly. The 
lowest panel displays the average income of both roles in each of the socio-economic groups. 
The “no information” benchmark is once again provided to allow a visual assessment of the 
effect of socio-economic information on the payoffs achieved in the game. 
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Figure 6. Average payoffs. 
Note: The bars represent the average payoff of the corresponding players in each socio-economic group (sub-title 
on top) in partnerships with subjects of each socio-economic group (indicated on the X-axis). For the WL 
subjects linked to BH subjects we have no observations on the latter. In this case, we therefore determined the 
WL payoffs by drawing from observations from a pilot.   
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The general picture that emerges from Figure 6 is that socio-economic information has an  
adverse effect on the behaviour in partnerships leading to negative payoff consequences. This 
holds in particular for BL subjects who are on the losing side in all but one of the possible 
partnerships. Only BL subjects in partnerships with WH subjects earn substantially more than 
in the “no information” benchmark. This is mainly due to the fact that WH subjects invest 
significantly more in partnerships with a BL receiver than in the “no information” benchmark, 
but receive significantly less from the BL subjects. While WH subjects are acting more 
generously than they would without information, the BL subjects are behaving less 
generously than they would without information. It is not surprising that the strongest payoff 
effects of the socio-economic information are present in this specific relationship, in which 
subjects exhibit preferences for differential treatment that are not based on monetary 
incentives.  
4. Determinants of Experimental Decisions 
In this section, we report a series of regression analyses that help to quantify the observed 
effects of the socio-economic information given to the subjects. Additionally, the regressions 
are used to check for correlations of the observed behaviour to the questionnaire answers 
provided by the subjects. We can confirm that low-income subjects send significantly less 
than other subjects if they are linked to high-income subjects of the other race. Moreover, we 
show that the questionnaire responses do not provide reliable forecasts on subjects’ behaviour. 
First, the regressions explaining the investment ratio are reported and then the regressions 
explaining the return ratio. 
4.1. Investment Ratio 
We used a double-censored Tobit regression with the investment ratio as the dependent 
variable. The results are summarized in Table 4. The variable names are self-explanatory. 
(See Appendix B for the definitions of variables that are reported.) 
Column 1 contains the coefficient estimates for the regression in which only the basic 
characteristics of the sender and the receiver are included. None of the coefficients are 
significant. In particular, not even the dummy variable “social distance,” which is equal to one 
when both the race and the income levels of the matched individuals are different, has 
significant explanatory power for the observed variations in the chosen investment ratios. This 
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may seem surprising on first sight, but is intuitively clear when we take into consideration that 
the observed behaviour towards subjects from another race and income group is asymmetric, 
since the low income subjects hold back investments in partnerships with high income 
subjects from the other race, but the opposite is not true. In column 2, we introduce a dummy 
variable called “income*soc,” which is equal to one when the sender has a low income and is 
matched with a subject of both a different race and a different income level. As expected, the 
coefficient of this variable is highly significant, conforming our experimental results.  
In column 3, questionnaire items measuring subjects’ perceptions of equity and fairness are 
included. None of the coefficients are significant. Finally, in column 4, subjects’ expectation 
of the amount invested and returned by their partner is included in the regression. The 
coefficient on the expected return ratio is positive and significant, suggesting that in general 
subjects’ own investment behaviour is driven by what they expect their counterparts to return. 
 
Table 4. Double-Censored Tobit Estimates on the INVESTMENT RATIO 
 1 2 3 4 
  CONSTANT 0.525 (0.111) 0.493 (0.109) 0.604 (0.181) 0.198 (0.176) 
  MALE -0.059 (0.071) -0.069 (0.069) -0.063 (0.074) -0.049 (0.063) 
  LOW INCOME 
-0.144 (0.082) -0.062 (0.086) -0.050 (0.091) -0.124 (0.078) 
  WHITE 0.127 (0.078) 0.096 (0.077) 0.082 (0.084) 0.046 (0.070) 
  INCOME-HETRO 0.056 (0.098) 0.057 (0.096) 0.081 (0.097) 0.141 (0.084) 
  RACE-HETRO 0.034 (0.104) 0.034 (0.101) 0.035 (0.102) 0.137 (0.088) 
  SOCIAL DISTANCE 
-0.161 (0.143) 0.179 (0.194) 0.171 (0.195) 0.055 (0.169) 
  INCOME*SOC 
 -0.462 (0.184) -0.487 (0.189) -0.372 (0.161) 
  PERCEPTIONS 
  -0.047 (0.041) -0.050 (0.036) 
  OPPORTUNITY   0.023 (0.074) -0.010 (0.062) 
  EDUCATION   0.054 (0.084) 0.046 (0.071) 
  TRUST INDEX   -0.034 (0.051) -0.034 (0.044) 
  EXP. INVEST RATIO    -0.054 (0.161) 
  EXP. RETURN RATIO    0.716 (0.106) 
  0.409 (0.031) 0.398 (0.030) 0.397 (0.030) 0.331 (0.025) 
  Log likelihood -98.988 -95.863 -94.656 -69.322 
:DOG7HVW ð 13.1 19.35 21.6 68.1 
  Observations 144 144 143 141 
Numbers in parentheses are the estimated standard errors. 
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4.2. Return Ratio  
The estimated coefficients of the return ratio regressions are summarized in Table 5. Since we 
used the strategy method, we have more than one observation for each respondent. In 
particular, each respondent had to state how much to return for each of the eleven possible 
amounts that could be received from the sender. To take the panel character of this data set 
into account, we employed the random effects tobit model.  
 
Table 5. Single Censored Tobit Estimates of the RETURN RATIO 
 
1 2 3 4 
  CONSTANT -0.181 (0.032) -0.189   (0.032) -0.034   (0.039) -0.198   (0.041) 
  0.014  (0.001) 0.014   (0.001) 0.015   (0.001) 0.015    (0.001) 
 ð -0.0001  (0.00001) -0.0001   (0.00001 -0.0001   (0.00001) -0.0001  (0.00001) 
  MALE 0.073  (0.015) 0.039  (0.012) 0.011  (0.013) 0.004   (0.012) 
  LOW INCOME -0.051  (0.017) -0.034   (0.014) -0.003  (0.014) -0.066    (0.014) 
  WHITE -0.004  (0.015) 0.027   (0.014) -0.038  ( 0.012) -0.02    (0.013) 
  INCOME-HETRO 0.005  (0.017) 0.003  (0.015) -0.025  ( 0.013) -0.035    (0.014) 
  RACE-HETRO -0.017  (0.019) 0.08    (0.017) 0.043   (0.0211) 0.046    (0.016) 
  SOCIAL DISTANCE -0.011  (0.029) 0.047   (0.026) 0.144   (0.031) 0.102    (0.026) 
  INCOME*SOC  -0.12   (0.039) -0.201  (0.024) -0.178    (0.025) 
  PERCEPTIONS   -0.03   (0.006) 0.01   (0.005) 
  OPPORTUNITY   -0.048   (0.01) -0.021    (0.013) 
  EDUCATION   0.004   (0.015) -0.008    (0.012) 
  TRUST INDEX   -0.023   (0.007) 0.02    (0.008) 
  EXP. INVEST RATIO    0.212   (0.023) 
  EXP. RETURNRATIO    0.019   (0.008) 
  H 0.17   (0.005) 0.169   (0.005) 0.182   (0.005) 0.174   (0.004) 
 X 0.137   (0.003) 0.136   (0.003) 0.0134   (0.003) 0.0135   (0.003) 
  Rho 0.607   (0.016 0.607   (0.017) 0.646    (0.014) 0.624   (0.015) 
  Log likelihood 447.833 456.152 465.68 462.46 
:DOG7HVW ð 511.51 595.96 718.63 760.77 
  Observations 1573 1573 1562 1550 
Numbers in parentheses are the estimated standard errors. 
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The return ratio is positively correlated to the amount available to the subject, +RZHYHU
since the return ratio increases as a decreasing rate, there is a negative effect of the square of 
the amount available. The baseline regression also includes the characteristics of both the 
investor and responder, as reported in column 1 of Table 5. It seems that males return more, 
while low income participants return less. Neither income nor race heterogeneity, however, 
seems to play a role in responder’s decision on the return. And again, as in the case of the 
investments, the symmetric cross-effect of income and race (“social distance”) is not 
significant, while the asymmetric cross-effect (“income*soc”) has a significantly negative 
effect on the return ratio, thus conforming the negative effect of cross-cultural envy. 
Adding the questionnaire responses to the regression (column 3), provides significantly 
negative, but very small effects for the “perceptions” and “trust index” variables, which 
indicate whether the subject perceives inequality as having been generated fairly and whether 
the subject generally trusts others, correspondingly. However, since both coefficients switch 
to positive, as soon as we add the expectation on investment and return (in column 4), it 
seems that the actual effect of these variables cannot be measured very precisely. But, there is 
a significantly positive effect between the expected investment and return measures and the 
return ratio.      
5. Concluding remarks 
We report the results of a series of experimental trust games conducted in South Africa 
focusing on the effects of racial and income inequality on cooperation in partnerships. We 
vary the amount of socio-economic information available to the subjects about their 
counterparts in order to assess the effect of inequality between the partners.  In the control 
treatment, in which no such information is provided, we observe no significant differences in 
the behaviour across races and income groups. In fact, despite the extreme heterogeneity of 
the South African society, we find that the general level of trust and trustworthiness observed 
in the control treatment is very similar to what is observed in more homogenous societies.  
When socio-economic information on their counterparts is provided to the subjects, individual 
trust behaviour is affected significantly. While we neither observe simple racial nor simple 
income-based discrimination, we do observe that the low income subjects from both racial 
groups invest significantly less in partnerships with the high income subjects of the other 
racial group than in any other partnership. Interestingly, the exceptionally low investment 
ratios, that are observed in these “maximal distance” partnerships, cannot be attributed to 
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particularly low return expectations. Hence, it seems clear that the motivation for such 
behaviour is genuinely non-monetary and perhaps best described as “cross-racial envy.”  
Interestingly, with the one exception of black high-income subjects in partnerships with low-
income subjects of their own race, we find no differentiating or discriminatory action by high-
income subjects towards other groups. This outcome is especially surprising, not only because 
of the history of “white supremacy” in South Africa, but also because the relative cost of 
discrimination is lower for the high-income groups than for the low-income groups (i.e. the 
efficiency loss in a mixed partnership hurts the rich less than it hurts the poor). It remains an 
open issue, whether the political changes of the last decades have created a social consensus 
of non-discrimination amongst the high-income white South Africans16 or whether the norm 
of non-discrimination had evolved earlier and was then at the root of the political process. In 
either case, our finding indicates a fundamental support of the anti-apartheid norms by the 
high-income white subjects, even when they have to “put their money where their mouth is,” 
i.e. bear the financial risk and cost of their non-discriminatory actions. 
Although the results of this study, like those of most other micro-economic studies, must only 
be cautiously generalised to the macro-economic level, we do believe to have found some 
evidence with macro-economic implications. On the one hand, it seems that substantial socio-
economic gaps in an economy, i.e. great cultural diversity and considerable inequality, may 
interact to create inefficiencies due to distrust and discrimination. Hence, we find some 
support for the growing body of literature that indicates that closing the “gaps” may actually 
increase economic efficiency. On the other hand, however, our results also seem to indicate 
that the genesis of inequality affects the attitudes and the behaviour of the economic agents. 
Thus, we must conclu3de that socio-economic differences may affect behaviour in different 
ways, depending on the history of social interaction. The history of social interaction in South 
Africa, for example, may explain why high-income black subjects may have less scruples to 
discriminate against others than high-income white subjects.  
Finally, since the provision of socio-economic information may exacerbate the inefficiency 
caused by distrust and discrimination, states with high degrees of social diversity and 
economic inequality may be well-advised to create institutions that mask all personal 
                                                           
16
 In particular, for this group the introduction of democratic institutions after the breakdown of apartheid may 
have generated the confidence that mutually beneficial policy outcomes would be adopted by the black majority, 
in line with Collier’s (2001) findings that democracy can mitigate detrimental effects of ethnic diversity. 
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attributes of investors. This may be achieved by installing (trusted) government financing or 
(controlled) impersonal investment and venture capital corporations. 
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Appendix A: Instructions 
Welcome to our experiment, which is part of a research project of Tilburg University in co-operation with the 
North West University. In this experiment you can earn real money that will be paid to you privately in cash at 
the end of the experiment. Because participants take part in the experiment at different times and places, the 
experiment may not end today. After the session, we will inform you when and where you can pick up your 
payoff. How much money you will receive in the end depends on your decisions and the decisions of other 
participants of the experiment. 
We will read these instructions together. After this you will have ample opportunity to ask questions. If you have 
a question by then, please raise your hand and we will help you. 
 
Description 
In this experiment, you will be randomly matched to another participant. Both of you start with an endowment of 
20 Rand. Each of you will decide what amount of money to transfer to the other. You will decide one after the 
other. The first to decide is called player A, the second to decide is called player B. For now you do not know 
whether you are player A or B. You will be informed later. 
If you are player A, you will decide how much of your initial endowment (20 Rand) you want to transfer to 
player B. The amount that you transfer to player B must be an even number that means a number from the set {0, 
2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20}. Your transfer to B will be tripled by the experimenter. For example, if you are 
player A and transfer 4 Rand to player B, the amount that B will actually receive is 3 x 4 = 12 Rand. Note that 
you can decide not to transfer money to player B. If you do not, then nothing is tripled and each of you will have 
the original 20 Rand to take home. 
If you are player B, you will receive the tripled amount of money that was transferred to you by player A. This 
tripled amount is added to your initial endowment of 20 Rand. For example, if you are player B and player A has 
transferred 4 Rand to you, then you will have total amount of 20 + 12 = 32 Rand. Now, you can decide to 
transfer some part of your total earnings to A. Your transfer to A is not tripled. The remaining part of your total 
earnings (the amount that you did not transfer to A) is your payoff of the experiment. Note that you can decide 
not to transfer money to player A. If you do not, then you will have your total earnings to take home, while A 
will have the original endowment minus the transfer made to you. 
 
Decision Form (with information on partner) 
This is the decision form that you must fill out.  You will make decisions both for the role as player A and as 
player B.  A random draw will later determine whether you are actually player A or player B.  
Upon registration, the participant to whom you are matched has provided the following information*):  
Race   [ ] black   [ ] white  [ ] other 
Family Income [ ] below average [ ] above average 
The corresponding information that you have provided is also given to the participant you are matched with. 
 
Suppose you are player A 
Please, fill in your decisions as player A on the blanks in the lines 1) and 2). 
1) Your transfer to player B is           _______ Rand 
Remember that you may only choose an even number. 
So, you may choose from: 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, or 20. 
2) You expect B to transfer to you       _______ Rand 
 
Suppose you are player B 
The table below lists all possible amounts that player A may send to you. If you are randomly determined to be 
player B, only one of these amounts will actually count, namely the one that was chosen by the player A who is 
                                                           
*)
 In the no information treatment, no information on race and income is provided to the subjects. 
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matched to you. But, since for now you do not know which amount will actually be chosen by player A, you 
must make a transfer decision for every possible amount.. 
 
A transfers 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
A retains 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 
B receives 0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 
B has 20 26 32 38 44 50 56 62 68 74 80 
B transfers            
 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
Please, fill in a transfer to A in each of these empty cells. 
Make sure that the transfer you fill in is not greater than the amount in the cell immediately above it. 
 
 
You expect A to transfer to you       _______ Rand  
Remember that A may only choose an even number.  
So, A may choose from: 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, or 20. 
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Appendix B.  Summary statistics of variables used in regressions 
VARIABLES Mean StD. Definition of Variables used 
MALE 0.473 0.45 Dummy 1 if male 
LOW INCOME 0.646 0.479 Dummy 1 if family income is below average 
WHITE 0.459 0.498 Dummy 1 if white 
EDUCATION 0.465 0.500 Dummy 1 if parents have college degree 
PERCEPTION 2.850 0.869 Index of economic position based on ability, based on questionnaire responses from  1 
(disagree strongly) to 4 (agree strongly) 
OPPORTUNITY 0.479 0.500 Dummy 1 if subjects perceive equality in opportunity 
TRUST INDEX 0.706 0.707 Index of GSS fair, trust and help 
INCOME-HETRO 0.534 0.500 Dummy 1 if match is different in income 
RACE-HETRO 0.479 0.500 Dummy 1 if match is different in race 
SOCIAL DISTANCE 0.250 0.433 Interactive term for INCOME-HETRO*RACE-HETRO 
INCOME*SOC 0.187 0.390 Interactive term for INCOME and SOCIAL DISTANCE 
AMOUNT SENT 0.451 0.321 Amount sent out of available stake 
RETURN RATIO 0.285 0.224 Amount returned out of available amount 
EXP. RETURN RATIO 0.367 0.207 Expected return out of available amount 
EXP. INVEST RATIO 0.606 0.311 Expected amount sent out of available amount 
 
